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by William C. Keathley
Personal experiences in the management of
projects and shared experiences with col-
leagues have convinced me that a Cost Plus
Award Fee contract is the best procurement
vehicle for the high-tech, one-of-a-kind, de-
velopment projects that constitute most of
NASA's projects. But, like most things, suc-
cess isn't automatic. It takes work to make it
happen, and the successful implementation
of award fee contracts is no exception. In fact,
the use of this type of contract requires more
government and contractor effort than other
forms of contracts. But, in my opinion, it's
worth every hour spent.
Over the years, I've collected a list of"lessons
learned" related to the use of award fee con-
tracts. I'll try to articulate those lessons ade-
quately in the following text. Keep in mind
that I'm not speaking from the standpoint of
a procurement officer. My observations come
from the day-to-day use of these contracts in
various positions I've held--project manager,
director of flight projects (project manager's
supervisor), and fee determination official.
An award fee contract is described as an ar-
rangement whereby the government periodi-
cally awards a fee consistent with the cost,
schedule and technical performance that is
achieved by a contractor during a preset peri-
od with preset award fee pools.
Rationale
Let me explain why I like award fee contract-
ing. First, it's the only contracting method
where both government and contractor goals
are closely linked. The government wants
cost, schedule and technical performance; the
contractor wants profits. The better the total
performance, the better the fees (profits) will
be. Compare that with a fixed price contract
where the total price (cost plus fee) is fixed. If
the cost of a fixed price effort is underesti-
mated, the contractor may sometimes make
adjustments that impose risks to the techni-
cal performance. This protects the contrac-
tor's profits but imposes risk on the govern-
ment's goal for technical performance. Other
ways exist for contractors to protect their
fees in a fixed price arrangement (all of them
bad for the government), but that subject de-
serves a separate paper.
Second, an award fee contract has a built-in
mechanism to conveniently alter and empha-
size program events in order to satisfy cur-
rent external and internal situations--and
the government is involved in these adjust-
ments. Prior to each award fee period, the
government and contractor project managers
review the plan for the upcoming period,
agree on the planned events, and place the
appropriate emphasis on each event. Should
problems arise (and they always do), the plan
and the fee emphasis can be adjusted accord-
ingly. This is considered by most project
managers to be the most important feature of
award fee contracts.
And while rm on adjustments, I'd like to
mention the use of "rollovers," in which lost
fee from prior periods is used to "sweeten the
pot" on future events that have become so
critical that additional emphasis is warrant-
ed. Rollover is a powerful award fee tool to
motivate contractors if used properly.
Third, the award fee process demands good
communication between the government and
contractor participants. And every project
manager knows or should know that good
communication is a necessary ingredient of
every successful project. The meetings re-
quired by award fee contracting reinforce the
need for clear communication.
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Fourth, I have learned that contractor per-
formance on award fee contracts is superior
to performance by the same contractors on
other types of contracts. The quality of the
product is certainly superior. The fee earned
by those contractors is better than they could
have received on other cost type contracts,
and it should be. Remember: better perfor-
mance, which the government wants, results
in higher fees, which the contractor wants. I
don't have any data on fixed price contracts
because there is no government knowledge of
final costs of those types of contracts. But I'll
bet award fees are close to the profits custom-
arily realized by contractors, even on fixed
price development contracts.
The downside to award fee contracting is the
additional contractor and government per-
sonnel required to implement award fee con-
tracts. It is certainly true that more people
are needed to formally assess contractor per-
formance, conduct performance evaluation
board meetings, and report findings to the
fee determination official. But I maintain
that most of that work should be done under
any circumstances, and the improved com-
munication is worth the effort. So I'm not
sympathetic to those complaints.
Implementation
All the good features discussed above can go
down the drain with faulty implementation.
I've found the following nine ground rules to
be effective in properly implementing the
award fee contracts in which I've been in-
volved. I will readily admit that there should
be many ways to skin this cat, but frankly,
I've found no effective alternatives to the fol-
lowing rules. I've also seen instances where
both the government and the contractor
failed to reach their objectives as a direct re-
sult of deviations from one or more of the fol-
lowing rules.
First, the government project manager must
chair the Performance Evaluation Board
(PEB). After all, the project manager is the
key official selected by NASA to be responsi-
ble for the project cost, schedule and techni-
cal performance. The project manager is in
the best position to evaluate the importance
of the performance during the project evolu-
tion and obviously has the most to gain or
lose from that performance or lack thereof. If
that's not true, the Agency should find an-
other project manager. On the other hand,
it's crucial that the contractor understand
that the government project manager is the
most influential government individual for
all project activities, and looking elsewhere
for project-level influence is unproductive.
Second, the PEB should consist of institu-
tional members who are participating in the
project: procurement, business (program con-
trol in some Centers), engineering, and prod-
uct assurance (quality control and safety at
some Centers). Depending on the end item or
service, science and operations should also be
added. It's advisable to keep the PEB mem-
bership as small as possible, and it's impor-
tant to select individuals with experience ap-
plicable to the end item or service delivered.
In other words, make sure they are capable of
understanding what the contract monitors
are telling them.
Third, the Fee Determination Official (FDO)
should be no higher than one level above the
project manager and, in fact, should be the
project manager's line supervisor. The FDO
must have more than a passing knowledge of
the project's status. This requires frequent
interactions with the project manager, which
the supervisor's position provides. Devi-
ations from this rule can result in some aw-
fully dumb fee determinations. I might add
that if the project manager reports to the
Center director, the deputy Center director
should be the FDO. Center directors should
not be FDOs and should be reserved to re-
solve institutional or project issues should
they arise.
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Fourth, use adjectives that can be understood
and that properly describe performance lev-
els. I prefer the academic model where "Sat-
isfactory" is used for barely passing perfor-
mance (a 60 or 70 percent performance rat-
ing, depending on your preferences.) Levels
below "Satisfactory" can be identified as
"Poor" and "Failing." Levels above "Satisfac-
tory" can be called "Good" and "Excellent."
It's confusing to everyone when fee curves
are set so that the fee letter indicates a con-
tractor got a "Superior" rating but received
only 65 percent of the available fee for that
period. Don't laugh; that's actually hap-
pened.
Fifth, skew the fee curve (fee earned vs. per-
formance rating) so that most of the avail-
able fee falls above "Satisfactory," or what-
ever you've decided to call passing perfor-
mance. This clearly shows our desire for high
performance and motivates the contractor to
exceed a mere passing grade.
Sixth, make the award fee periods sufficient-
ly long to allow time to correct deficiencies
after a midterm review by the project manag-
ers. I prefer six-month periods. This allows
the project managers to assess the perfor-
mance status three months into the period in
order to identify performance problems, and
then still provides three months to correct
the situation before final evaluation and
scoring of that period's performance. Periods
of less than four months preclude this impor-
tant process.
Seventh, offercontractors an opportunity to
present self-assessments of their perfor-
mance to the PEB and the FDO. Some con-
tractorswill choose not to do this,but the in-
vitation ought to be given. Ifthe offeris ac-
cepted, I believe the PEB should hear the
contractor's self-assessment before making
the final rating.As an FDO, I definitelypre-
ferred hearing the contractor's self-assess-
ment before hearing the PEB's story. I've
found that the major advantage ofcontractor
self-assessments is that they indicate faulty
communication between the government and
the contractor--which will kill a successful
project more quickly than anything I know.
Eighth, rollovers should be allowed in the
award fee plan but never promised. They
should be left to the discretion of the FDO
and result from recommendations by the
PEB. They should be used infrequently and
always targeted to specific events that have
become crucial to the success of the project.
Specific "go/no-go" performance criteria
must be established for these events and an-
nounced in the fee letter for the period pre-
ceding the period in which the selected event
falls.
Finally, and most importantly, the contrac-
tor project manager and the government pro-
ject manager must jointly agree on miles-
tones and criteria, and the emphasis to be
placed on each, before the beginning of each
award fee period. And then everyone must
stick to the agreements. This won't eliminate
disagreements with the amount of fee award-
ed, but it does eliminate surprises, which are
simply unacceptable. Nothing can kill an
award fee process quicker and demoralize
contractors more than to be "dinged" for
something they didn't know.
Fee Determinations
Now let's look at the lessons learned in the
awards themselves. The first and most im-
portant ground rule is: don't play games. If
the contractor earned all of the fee, by all
means award it. Don't fall into the trap of
telling yourself, "If I give 100 percent, the
contractor will start expecting it every time."
Or: "The contractor earned 100 percent, but
I'll give 80 percent to give some room to im-
prove." Or just as bad: "If I give the contrac-
tor the 20 percent really earned, I'll get the
project manager fired." Awards that are too
high or too low are equally bad. Awards that
are too high tellthe contractor to under per-
form and get away with it.Awards that are
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too low tell the contractor that no matter how
hard the work and how much the accomplish-
ment, efforts will be in vain. Both situations
are bad and will demoralize the contractor.
Stick to the prior agreements and award the
fee consistent with the actual performance.
If the performance is deficient and your
awards are consistently fair, you'll soon see
the performance improve. If the performance
is good, and the contractor is convinced that
fees will be lost by backsliding, the perfor-
• mance will remain high. In case you didn't
notice, the operating word is fair. By the
way, it's a good idea to keep histograms for
the percentage fee earned as the program de-
velops. If the awards have been consistent
(fair), you'll see the hills (good times) and
valleys (problems) that occur in any develop-
ment activity.
Award Fee Letter
Now for the important fee letter where you
tell the contractor about the determination.
Believe me, you can ruin a good award fee
process and all the work you've done by issu-
ing an award fee letter that no one under-
stands. It would be impossible to overstate
the importance of these letters.
I've found the letters should have four basic
parts. The first paragraph is really a boiler-
plate paragraph that references the contract
title and number, identifies the period for
which the award is given, states the percent-
age of the award earned and the specific dol-
lar amount, and gives the performance adjec-
tive rating. The second paragraph should
identify the instances of commendable per-
formance. Be specific, even if you have to use
bulleted items. Be clear. The contractor must
understand which ratings were high so as to
pass the accolades along to the working
troops. The third paragraph should identify
deficiencies. Again, it's extremely important
to be specific and clear. I call the final fourth
paragraph the "message" paragraph. The
content of this paragraph can range from
"keep up the good work" to "be advised that
continued inferior performance in (a certain
area) will have serious effects on future over-
all fee determinations."
A good contractor general manager will do
several things with the fee letter; that is, if it
is understood. First, a meeting with the pro-
ject manager will be held to review the letter.
The project manager will be commended for
the things done properly (second paragraph),
actions will be identified to correct recur-
rence of the deficiencies (third paragraph),
and the message (fourth paragraph) will be
discussed and actions (project or institution-
al) will be identified to respond to the thrust
of the message.
Next, the good general manager will send a
letter to the FDO stating that the award has
been reviewed with the project manager, the
recognition of the commendable items is ap-
preciated, the deficiencies and message are
understood, and appropriate actions have
been assigned. In addition, the general man-
ager will now be in a good position to report
the profit status on this contract and articu-
late the details of the award. All of these
good things transpire when the contractor
understands the fee letter. Otherwise, there
is no follow-up or feedback, the situation can-
not be explained to corporate reviewers, and
everybody loses.
The understanding of the awarded fee is so
important that I added one more step to the
process. As an FDO, if a general manager
called and verbally complained about certain
elements of the award, I would discuss the
call with the government project manager
and provide verbal feedback to the general
manager. If the complaint came in writing, I
would reconvene the PEB with instructions
to draft a written response to only the specific
concerns stated in the general manager's let-
ter, not every element of the award. I would
then discuss the recommended government
response with the PEB. If I agreed with the
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PEB position, I would send the written re-
sponse to the general manager. I have
changed a prior award in the contractor's fa-
vor after learning that the PEB used errone-
ous information. In that case, the general
manager was correct and the contractor
earned the fee increase. After all, that was
the fair thing to do. The contractor response
to that small dollar change was tremendous,
and performance improved markedly.
So in summation, I believe that award fee
contracting is particularly suited to the one-
of-a-kind development projects which consti-
tute most of NASA's efforts. I do not believe
fixed price contracts or fixed price plus incen-
tive contracts belong in this environment.
Perhaps someone else may wish to argue the
advantages of the latter types, but my exper-
ience suggests that award fee contracting is
the better way to go.
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